I ran a basic open-source intelligence (OSINT) assessment on myself: the kind of reconnaissance an attacker, a recruiter or a reviewer would do in ten minutes.
The worst finding wasn’t a leaked password. It was attribution. DBLP had merged my publications with another researcher who shares my name. To anyone checking my record, my work and his were one person.
The rest followed a familiar pattern:
- old email addresses still live,
- profiles abandoned years ago,
- the same name used inconsistently across platforms.
None of it is dangerous on its own. Together, it makes your identity easy to confuse and easy to impersonate.
The fix was dull and effective: one domain, one research email, one ORCID iD linked everywhere, with old profiles either updated or closed.
Your public footprint is an attack surface and a CV at the same time. Audit it before someone else does.
Find me: ORCID · christoskalyvas.eu